A Shahed-136 drone is displayed during a rally in west Tehran, Iran, February 11, 2026.
Nuphoto | Nuphoto | Getty Images
In the aftermath of Israeli-American strikes against Iran, American allies in the Persian Gulf hear a sound that Ukrainian soldiers have long feared: the disturbing drone of the Shahed-136 “kamikaze” drone.
First designed in Iran, the Shahed has already become a staple of modern warfare, with Tehran’s strategic partner Russia using the technology during its years-long invasion of Ukraine.
Today, drones – the most advanced of which is the long-range Shahed-136 – have become essential in Iran’s retaliatory strategy against the United States and its regional allies, with thousands of devices deployed so far.
At first glance, the Shahed is unremarkable compared to cutting-edge weapons technologies, with analysts sometimes calling it a “poor man’s cruise missile.”
But while U.S. allies managed to intercept the vast majority of incoming drones with the help of U.S.-supplied defense systems, such as the “Patriot” missile, many Shaheds still managed to hit their targets.
The United Arab Emirates Defense Ministry said Tuesday that of 941 Iranian drones detected since the start of the war in Iran, 65 have fallen on its territory, damaging ports, airports, hotels and data centers.
The Shahed…gave states like Russia and Iran a cheap way to impose disproportionate costs.
Patrycja Bazylczyk
Analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
Analysts say the key to their effectiveness lies in the numbers. Drones are relatively cheap and easy to mass produce, especially compared to the sophisticated systems used to defend against them.
These factors make the drone ideal for invading and overloading air defenses, with each intercepted drone also representing a more valuable defense asset spent.
“The Shahed-136, among other unmanned aerial systems, has allowed states like Russia and Iran to impose disproportionate costs cheaply,” said Patrycja Bazylczyk, a missile defense project analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC.
“They force adversaries to waste expensive interceptors on low-cost drones, project power, and create a constant psychological burden on civilian populations.”
The cost imbalanceWE government reports describe the Shahed-136 as a one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicle produced by Iranian entities linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Compared to ballistic missiles, drones fly low and slow, deliver a relatively modest payload and are limited to mostly stationary targets, Behnam Ben Taleblu, senior director of the Iran program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told CNBC.
Public estimates suggest that individual Shahed drones can cost between $20,000 and $50,000. In contrast, ballistic and cruise missiles can cost millions of dollars each.
In this sense, the Shahed and its equivalents “essentially serve as a ‘poor man’s cruise missile,’ providing a means to strike and harass adversaries “at low cost,” Taleblu said.
For Iran, which faces both international sanctions and limitations on acquiring advanced weapons, this cost advantage is significant.
Meanwhile, air defense systems used by Gulf states and Israel can be expensive. between $3 million and $12 million per interceptoraccording to budget documents from the US Department of Defense.
This cost gap raises a serious problem for Iran’s enemies: air defense systems have a limited number of missile defenses, with each intercepted target representing a valuable asset spent.
Primary technical data from the US Army’s ODIN database and Iranian military information describe the Shahed-136 as approximately 3.5 meters long and with a wingspan of 2.5 meters.
Sergei Supinsky | Afp | Getty Images
Thus, in a war of attrition, drones could be used by Tehran to weaken air defenses, opening them to more damaging attacks, analysts say.
“The logic is to expend the drones as soon as possible while preserving the ballistic missiles in the long term,” said CSIS’s Bazylczyk.
She added that Iran’s ability to maintain mass use of drones will depend on its stockpiles, its ability to protect or restore its supply chain, and the ability of the United States and Israel to significantly disrupt the flow of components or production sites.
The United States has long sought to disrupt Iranian production of the Shahed-136 and recently imposed new sanctions targeting suppliers of suspect components in Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates.
However, Russian production of Shahed drones shows that such systems can be manufactured on a large scale in times of war and in the context of targeted sanctions.
American officials claim Iran launched more than 2,000 drones into the conflict on Wednesday. However, the country reportedly has large stockpiles and may be able to produce hundreds more each week, according to military experts. would have told The National newspaper.
“Gulf countries are at risk of exhausting their interceptors if they are not more careful about when they fire these interceptors,” said Joze Pelayo, a Middle East security analyst at the Atlantic Council think tank.
“Exhaustion is not imminent, but it remains a pressing issue,” he said. However, multi-pronged attacks by Iranian allies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis could put stocks at risk of being depleted within days, he added.
A new must-have for the modern battlefield?The Shahed-136 was first unveiled around 2021 and attracted worldwide attention after Russia began deploying Iran-supplied weapons during its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
The Kremlin has since received thousands of drones and started producing them based on Iranian plans, highlighting their repeatable and scalable design.
A few analysts have suggested that Iran has drawn on Russia’s extensive battlefield experience with drones, including modifications such as anti-jam antennas, electronic warfare-resistant navigation and new nuclear warheads.
These warheads typically carry between 30 and 50 kg of explosives and can be powerful, particularly when used in large swarms, with advanced versions capable of a range of up to 1,200 miles.
Michael Connell, a Middle East specialist at the Center for Naval Analyzes, said the Shahed-136 proved so effective that the United States reverse-engineered it and deployed its own version on the battlefield against Iranian targets.
During its attacks on Iran this weekend, the US Central Command confirmed that it had used its drones modeled on the Shahed for the first time in combat.
As unmanned attack drones become a fixture of the modern battlefield, the methods for managing them are also evolving.
According to Taleblu of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Ukraine has had some success shooting down drones with gunfire from fighter jets, a more durable deterrent than missile interceptors.
Ukraine too recently launched the development of cheaper, mass-produced interceptors, which kyiv believes could stop the Shahed.
Gulf states should also adopt more sustainable approaches. The Pentagon and at least one Gulf government are would have in talks to buy cheaper Ukrainian-made interceptors.
Meanwhile, Qatar’s Defense Ministry says it is using its air force aircraft to intercept Iranian attacks, including Shahed drones, alongside ground-based air defenses.
Electronic warfare targeting the Shahed’s GPS, as well as short-range missiles and directed energy systems such as Israel’s Iron Beam, are also significantly cheaper to operate than traditional interceptors.
Yet analysts say Gulf states currently lack rapid, high-volume counter-drone capabilities. Developing and deploying such systems will likely take years, said the Atlantic Council’s Pelayo.
