What future for Mali’s military leaders after the shock of the rebel offensive?
Makuochi Okafor,BBC AfricaAnd
Mohamed Ibrahim,Arab BBC
It is difficult to overstate the sense of shock that resonated across West Africa after attackers, in coordinated attacks, managed to enter Mali’s capital, Bamako, assassinate the defense minister and take control of northern regions.
Residents in cities across the country woke up Saturday to gunfire and explosions – attacks that an alliance of two groups – the separatist Azawad Liberation Front (ALF) and the al-Qaeda-linked JNIM group – said were behind.
It took several days for Goïta to appear since the offensive, raising questions about the future of the junta, as well as the role of Russian forces deployed in Mali and neighboring countries to face the security threat.
So what will happen next?
Scenario 1: the junta remains in power and fights back
Many analysts believe this remains the most likely outcome in the short term, as the military still controls most major cities as well as state institutions.
But they say the next few days could be critical as the military launches a counteroffensive against JNIM and the FLA.
Whether it succeeds or not “will determine the longevity of the junta,” according to Beverly Ochieng, senior analyst at global consultancy Control Risks.
Three days after the offensive, Colonel Goïta gave a televised address to the nation, affirming that the situation was under control and pledging to “neutralize” those responsible for the attacks.
Earlier, the presidency’s social media accounts had published photos of Colonel Goïta meeting the Russian ambassador to Mali, Igor Gromyko, a sign of the importance that the junta still attaches to this alliance.
There were also photos of the putschist visiting a hospital where those injured in the attack are being treated.
Camara’s death could also hamper relations with Russia, according to Ulf Laessing, head of the Sahel program at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, a center-right German think tank.
Camara was one of the most powerful figures in the ruling structure and “Moscow’s main interlocutor and the mastermind behind the deployment of Russian mercenaries in the Sahel”, he added.
While Malian forces say they are fighting to secure key regions of the country, they will have their work cut out for them as the FLA has signaled its ambitions to move south from Kidal.
“We want to take control of the town of Gao. All the gates of Gao have fallen, but not the army camps,” said spokesman Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane.
He told the BBC that the historic city of Timbuktu was also in their sights: “It will be easy to take power once we have full control of Gao and Kidal. »
The junta enjoyed popular support when it took power nearly six years ago, promising to resolve Mali’s long-running security crisis.
But it was already forced into a defensive stance last year by JNIM’s oil blockade of the capital, as militants broadened their insurgency to include economic warfare.
If the armed groups manage to maintain their advance, Mali could face a prolonged conflict, affecting the future of the junta.
Scenario 2: the junta remains in power with Russian support but seeks new partners
Last weekend’s attacks also damaged Russia’s image as a reliable security partner in Mali, according to Ochieng.
After the military takeover at the start of the decade, French forces, which had been supporting the army, were ordered to leave and Russian fighters came in their place to help quell the insurgency.
The Russians’ reputation “took a big blow” after the failure of the Africa Corps to defend major cities and the fall of Kidal, Laessing adds.
While retaining Russian support, Mali could be pushed to expand its military partnerships.
One possible option could involve closer ties with Turkey, which seeks to expand its influence in Africa.
Ochieng says there are reports of the deployment of a Turkish security contact “to train the presidential guard” in Mali.
Mali has also shown signs of renewed engagement with the United States after years of strained relations.
Earlier this year, Nick Hocker, head of the State Department’s African affairs section, visited Bamako to express “US respect for Mali’s sovereignty” and outline a “new direction” in relations, aimed at moving beyond “political missteps.”
He also said the United States intends to work more closely with Mali’s neighbors and allies, Burkina Faso and Niger, on shared security and economic priorities.
Bamako could also rely more on the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which brings together Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, all military-led governments.
The bloc has pledged to support Mali, even though it has yet to act as a major joint fighting force.
For Russia, the key question is whether it can maintain its influence if Mali diversifies its security ties.
The crisis could also become a test of its broader strategy in Africa, where Moscow has expanded its influence through military partnerships.
If Russian-backed forces are seen as incapable of protecting their key allies, other governments in the region may reconsider their reliance on Moscow.
Scenario 3: Pressure forces the junta out of power – but who takes over?
Saturday’s attacks represent the most serious challenge to military rule in years.
Further attacks could intensify pressure on the military government as public discontent grows.
A possible outcome would be another military coup, with another group of officers seizing power.
Alternatively, an FLA-JNIM alliance could replace the current government, but it would face serious internal tensions.
The FLA presents itself as a political and nationalist movement, while the JNIM is an armed Islamist group.
Mali’s separatist and Islamist groups have had on-and-off relations for years – dating back to 2012, when the Tuareg separatist rebellion was hijacked by Islamist militants.
An FLA spokesperson previously described JNIM fighters as their “cousins,” adding that “we share the same enemy, so we must be under the same umbrella.”
But FLA leader Sayed Bin Bella later told the BBC there was “no merger”.
“All the flags we have raised are ours, not those of Al-Qaeda. If they want to merge with us, they must withdraw from the global Al-Qaeda organization,” he said.
Analysts say these differences could complicate any future power-sharing deal.
JNIM has, in recent years, largely avoided the overtly global jihadist rhetoric often associated with al-Qaeda and similar groups, Ochieng says.
She believes one possible outcome could be a Syria-style situation, in which a group formerly affiliated with al-Qaeda takes power.
Syria’s leaders have been criticized by some radical Islamists for being too secular.
Similar accusations are already being leveled at JNIM due to its alliance with the FLA, analysts who monitor jihadist media channels reported.
However, ideological differences between the JNIM and the FLA could become a future source of tension, unless the separatists secure full control of the north and distance themselves from developments elsewhere in the country.
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