Friendship or leverage: why is Xi Jinping in North Korea?
Laura BickerChina Correspondent
For Chinese leader Xi Jinping, North Korea is the neighbor that China can neither control nor afford to lose.
Both sides often describe their relationship as being “forged in blood”, a reference to the Korean War.
However, in recent years, distrust has strained ties. And now Beijing is trying to reassert its hold on a strategically vital but deeply unpredictable partner.
China wants stability on its border and influence in Pyongyang, but without getting drawn into crises triggered by North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.
Xi’s visit this week – he arrived in Pyongyang on Monday – will therefore probably be less about friendship, more about leverage.
Seoul believes it could try to position China as a mediator between North Korea and the United States, but Beijing may have other motivations.
Western diplomatic sources told the BBC that China was increasingly concerned about the growing partnership between Pyongyang and Moscow.
After meeting with Russian leader Vladimir Putin last week, Xi may want to ensure he also keeps North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in check, especially as Beijing increases its presence on the world stage.
A thaw in strained bonds
The cooling between Beijing and Pyongyang was visible, if subtle.
They barely marked the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations in October 2024. Public messages remained silent.
China’s ambassador did not attend North Korea’s founding celebrations the previous month. There were no high-level exchanges throughout the year, in stark contrast to increasingly warm relations between Pyongyang and Moscow.
This growing proximity to Russia has destabilized Beijing.
After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, North Korea expanded military cooperation with Putin, culminating in a mutual defense pact signed during Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in 2024.
Around 2,300 North Korean soldiers have died fighting alongside Russia against Ukraine, according to a BBC investigation. Pyongyang is also accused of supplying munitions for Russia’s war effort in exchange for oil and aid, a development that has alarmed Washington and its allies and quietly rattled China.
“China wants to ensure that its interests vis-à-vis North Korea are protected at a time of rapid convergence between Moscow and Pyongyang,” adds Ankit Panda, a nuclear policy specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
China has only one formal defense treaty, that with North Korea.
Beijing is therefore unlikely to welcome a scenario in which Russia becomes a dominant influence in Pyongyang. A more confident and less dependent Kim would mean a reduction in Chinese influence.
Beijing responded by attempting to reset relations. Late last year, Xi invited Kim to a military parade in Beijing, keeping him prominently on display alongside Putin.
It was their first formal summit in six years. Xi hailed the two as “good neighbors, good friends and good comrades bound by a common destiny,” and called for closer strategic coordination. North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is notably absent from public statements.
Beijing has “mixed feelings” about the growing partnership between Pyongyang and Moscow, said Lee Seong-hyon, a visiting scholar at the Harvard University Asia Center.
On the one hand, the partnership “diverts attention from Washington and complicates U.S. strategy in multiple theaters, which indirectly benefits China,” Lee says.
But, he adds, expanded military cooperation between Russia and North Korea could trigger a stronger trilateral military response from the United States, Japan and South Korea, which would worry Beijing.
This is also why China does not support Pyongyang’s nuclear program – because it would increase US involvement in the region and its alliances here.
But China is also not addressing the problem head-on. In 2022, China and Russia vetoed a US-led United Nations resolution to impose new sanctions over North Korea’s missile tests.
If China takes a tough stance against Pyongyang’s nuclear program, “it will only push North Korea further into Putin’s arms,” said Victor Cha, chairman of the foreign policy department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
The pragmatic partner
But Kim also can’t afford to alienate his greatest source of help.
Chinese exports to North Korea jumped to around $2.3 billion (£1.7 billion) last year, the highest level in six years. Passenger train services between Beijing and Pyongyang restarted earlier this year after a six-year hiatus.
Analysts say it is also a calculated effort by Beijing to bring Pyongyang back into its orbit.
For Kim, it’s a pragmatic choice. If the war in Ukraine ends, Russia’s need for North Korean support could diminish. And unlike an isolated Putin, Xi welcomes world leaders to Beijing.
Kim must therefore ensure that he is not dependent on a weakened partner.
But this relationship was troubled from the start.
Kim inherited power with different priorities than his father. While Kim Jong Il visited China repeatedly and relied on support from Beijing, his son moved quickly to accelerate North Korea’s nuclear program. During his first six years in power, Kim oversaw about 90 ballistic missile tests and four nuclear detonations, more than his father and grandfather combined.
This alarmed Beijing. And then the execution of Kim’s uncle, Jang Song Thaek, considered by China as a stabilizing figure, widened the divide.
Xi responded with rare diplomatic signals of discontent, visiting South Korea in 2014 before meeting Kim: a move that was widely seen as a snub.
North Korea responded by calling China a “renegade and an enemy.”
It wasn’t until 2018, as sanctions over his nuclear program began to take hold, that Kim made his first known trip abroad.
He boarded his armored train and headed towards Beijing. This meeting marked the start of a careful recalibration.
Kim then met with the American and South Korean leaders, but always after consulting China. The message was clear: Pyongyang would not negotiate without Beijing’s support.
Today, North Korea serves as both a buffer and a burden for China. He keeps American forces at bay, but his weapons tests destabilize the region.
Kim, meanwhile, wants Chinese protection – without Chinese control.
Neither side fully trusts the other. But for now, they both believe they need the other and that’s enough to get them talking.
Additional reporting by Kelly Ng