Sacking of Atiku: What Justice Lifu based his judgement on

By Luminous Jannamike ABUJA – The leadership crisis rocking the African Democratic Congress (ADC) took a decisive turn when Justice Peter Lifu of the Federal High Court, Abuja, invalidated the emergence of Senator David Mark and other executives who assumed control of the party in July 2025. But the judgment of November 5, 2026, was not simply about competing claims to party leadership.

It hinged on a fundamental legal question: could the party’s National Executive Committee (NEC) use its constitutional powers to replace an existing elected leadership structure without complying with the democratic procedures prescribed by law? In the Certified True Copy (CTC) of the judgment obtained by Saturday Vanguard, Justice Lifu said he identified critical weaknesses in the defendants’ case, including the disputed resignation letter on which they relied, the limits of NEC’s administrative powers and the absence of satisfactory evidence that the new executives emerged through a democratic election.

The resignation letter One of the Mark-led camp’s principal arguments was that Nafiu Bala Gombe had voluntarily resigned as Deputy National Chairman on May 17, 2025, before the NEC meeting that produced the new leadership. The letter, tendered as Exhibit ADC 1, was intended to establish that Gombe had relinquished his position and consequently lacked the legal standing to challenge the subsequent leadership transition.

Justice Lifu, however, was unconvinced Rather than accept the document simply because it was certified, the judge examined its signature against Gombe’s signatures on other documents executed before a Commissioner for Oaths. He explained that certification established the status of a document as a true copy but did not, in itself, establish the authenticity of a disputed signature.

After comparing the documents, he said that he found material differences in their structure, style, formation and general manner of execution. “The signatures do not appear to be one and the same,” Justice Lifu observed. He consequently described the purported resignation letter as fictitious or fabricated and rejected it as reliable evidence that Gombe had voluntarily vacated his office.

The finding removed a central pillar of the defendants’ argument that Gombe had ceased to be an officer of the party before the July 2025 transition. Importantly, this was a finding made in determining the civil dispute, not a criminal conviction for forgery. NEC’s powers could not override the law The second major issue concerned the extent of NEC’s authority under Article 19(14) of the ADC constitution.

The defendants maintained that the provision empowered NEC to dissolve the existing National Working Committee (NWC), make administrative arrangements and install the new executives. Justice Lifu acknowledged that political parties enjoy autonomy in managing their internal affairs However, he held that such autonomy must operate within the limits of the Constitution and applicable electoral legislation.

He relied on Section 223(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution, which requires political parties to provide for periodic democratic elections of their principal officers and executive committees. He also considered Sections 82(1) and 82(3) of the Electoral Act 2022, alongside the relevant provisions of the Regulations and Guidelines for Political Parties, 2022.

His reasoning was that although NEC could exercise administrative powers under the party constitution, those powers could not be interpreted to dispense with mandatory democratic procedures. In effect, the authority to administer a political party was not an unrestricted licence to appoint its national executives in place of a legally required election.

Emergence if new Excos The decisive weakness in the defendants’ case, according to the judge, was the absence of satisfactory evidence that the new executives emerged through a democratic electoral process. The defendants relied on documents showing that INEC had received notice of the NEC meeting, monitored its proceedings and subsequently recognised the resulting leadership.

But Justice Lifu drew a clear distinction between notifying INEC and conducting a democratic election. He held that the Commission’s monitoring of the meeting did not establish that party members or duly elected delegates were given the opportunity to participate and vote for candidates of their choice. The judge explained that notice to INEC and compliance with democratic election requirements were separate legal obligations.

Consequently, neither the Commission’s attendance nor its subsequent recognition could validate a process that had not been shown to comply with the law. The court therefore found no satisfactory evidence that the emergence of Mark and the other executives was preceded by, or resulted from, a democratic election as required by Section 82(3) of the Electoral Act.

This was central to the outcome: the defendants could not establish the legality of their e