University hostels and rent control: Examining the Law and its limitations

Back in 1963, when Ghana passed its Rent Act, university accommodation was nothing like the commercial hostels we have today. In Ghana there is the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220) and the Rent Control Law, 1986 (P.N.D.C.L 138).
Back in 1963, when Ghana passed its Rent Act, university accommodation was nothing like the commercial hostels we have today. It was mostly halls of residence, institutional, part of the educational experience. Sixty years on, that has changed. Hostels built for purpose, decent fees, private capital and company management systems have turned student hostels into big business. But the legislation that regulates residential tenancies has not changed.
And so, the question of whether university hostels are covered by the Rent Act has come up recently. If you pay for a hostel, are you a tenant? Does the Rent Control Department have the same regulatory powers as it does over other tenancies? And, most importantly, can we use 60-year-old legislation to regulate something its drafters could not have imagined?
In Ghana there is the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220) and the Rent Control Law, 1986 (P.N.D.C.L 138). Under Act 220, Section 1 makes the Act applicable to all premises in Ghana. Section 36 makes reference to the landlord and tenant of any premises let at a rent. The Act recognises that notwithstanding the fact that the occupant of a property may not have exclusive possession of the property, a lease or tenancy may be created.
The Act however makes a significant distinction in Section 36 between premises and accommodation which is genuinely let at a rent which includes payments in respect of board or attendance. Board is meal arrangement as part of accommodation, and attendance is personal services such as cleaning the tenants’ room and other chores provided to the tenant. Therefore, in an instance where the landlord or landlady runs a boarding facility charging one price for a room, food and cleaning services, that facility is not covered by the Act. In a normal tenancy, the tenant is paying for only the premises, and the tenant arranges for anything else.
While not determinative of the university hostel concept, the distinction is important as the provision of electricity, water, security and maintenance is not considered to be board or attendance. That will depend on the package offered by the university or whoever is the provider of the service.
This distinction is further buttressed by the Rent Control Act, 1986 (PNDCL 138) which provides under section 1 for the regulation of rent in respect of certain specified classes of residential accommodation; and for related purposes; section 4 and 5 provide for the registration of tenancy agreements and the issuance of rent cards.
Of particular note is section 2(a) which provides that the law shall not apply to premises demised or held from the Government or any other agency of the State. While this may have some bearing on accommodation provided by the universities themselves, it becomes less clear where the accommodation is provided by a separate company or private provider.
It is important to note that this exception applies only in relation to section 1 of PNDCL 138 and does not exclude such premises from the operation of Act 220.
The application of the rent laws of Ghana to university hostels is therefore not just about whether or not students pay hostel fees. It depends on the nature of the transaction, the person providing the accommodation and the specific provision of the law.
The distinction between a lease and a licence remains central to the controversy.
A tenancy ordinarily confers possessory rights and an interest in land, while a licence generally grants personal permission to occupy premises without creating such an interest.
In Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809, the House of Lords held that an agreement described as a licence was, in substance, a tenancy because of the rights granted to the occupant.
The principle was memorably expressed by Bingham LJ in Antoniades v Villiers [1990] 1 AC 417, at 444:
“A cat does not become a dog because the parties have agreed to call it a dog.”
The legal character of an arrangement is determined by its substance rather than the terminology adopted by the parties.
An accommodation provider cannot avoid statutory tenancy obligations merely by describing a genuine tenancy as a licence. Equally, the payment of an accommodation fee does not automatically transform a personal licence into a tenancy.
In Westminster City Council v Clarke [1992] 2 AC 288, the House of Lords considered accommodation provided in a hostel where the institution retained substantial powers concerning supervision, access and room allocation. Having regard to the purpose and operational arrangements of the hostel, the Court held that the occupant was a licensee rather than a tenant.
University accommodation may exhibit similar characteristics. Occupation ordinarily depends upon student status, is limited to an academic period and remains subject to institutional regulations concerning discipline, visitors, room allocation and maintenance.
Nevertheless, institutional control does not invariably negate a tenancy, particularly having regard to the broader definition of a lease under Act 220.
Indeed, published UGEL residence agreements expressly employ the language of tenancy and describe accommodation charges as rent or residential facility user fees. Such contractual provisions are relevant evidence of a letting, notwithstanding the institution's continuing powers of residential management.
The English authorities are persuasive but must be applied consistently with Ghana's statutory definitions. The proper enquiry remains whether the rights granted constitute a letting within the meaning of Act 220.
STATUTORY TENANCY AND THE UNIVERSITY ACADEMIC CALENDAR
In this article we discuss the distinction between a lease and a licence. The difference between a lease and a licence is crucial to this debate.
Typically, a lease provides the lessee with a right of possession and an interest in the land, whereas a licence confers only a personal right to occupy the premises and not an interest in land.
The House of Lords in the case of Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809 found an arrangement described as a licence to be, in fact, a lease because the rights conferred upon the occupier were sufficient to establish the existence of a lease.
In the words of Bingham LJ in the case of Antoniades v Villiers [1990] 1 AC 417 at 444: “a cat does not become a dog because the parties have agreed to call it a dog.” It is the substance of the agreement that determines its legal status and not the language used by the parties. Thus, a landlord cannot escape the statutory regime of leases simply by referring to what is actually a lease as a licence, and a fee paid for the accommodation does not automatically make a licence a lease.
In the case of Westminster City Council v Clarke [1992] 2 AC 288, the House of Lords found that a hostel in which the institution retained considerable control over supervision, access and allocation of rooms to be a hostel to which a licence could be granted rather than a lease.
Similarities can be drawn with student accommodation in which the right to occupy the premises is dependent on the student detaining that status and is limited to an academic period subject to the institution’s rules and regulations as to discipline, guests, allocation of rooms and maintenance. However, such control does not necessarily preclude the finding of a lease, particularly in light of the extended definition of lease under Act 220.
Indeed, it is not uncommon for residence agreements published by the UGEL to refer explicitly to a tenancy and to refer to rents or residential facility user fees. Although this does not override the institution’s residual rights as a manager of residential property, such references in the contract are a good indication that a letting has taken place. The English cases are instructive but must be interpreted in line with the statutory provisions in Ghana. The key question is whether or not the right conferred on a student is a letting within the definition of a letting in Act 220.
INSPECTION POWERS AND ACCOMMODATION STANDARDS
The Rent Control Department's authority to inspect premises must also be considered within the statutory framework.
Section 5(2)(c) of Act 220 empowers a Rent Officer to enter and view premises or order their inspection where those premises are under consideration in the lawful performance of statutory functions.
Section 11(a) of PNDCL 138 separately authorises a Rent and Housing Committee to inspect residential premises to which the Act applies, at reasonable times and concerning a matter before it.
These provisions confer statutory inspection powers, but they do not authorise unrestricted entry into every building used for paid accommodation.
The premises must fall within the relevant statutory framework, and the inspection must be connected to a function lawfully exercisable by the officer or committee concerned.
Whether students occupy as tenants or licensees, accommodation providers may remain subject to contractual obligations concerning maintenance and repairs, as well as applicable public health, fire safety and building-control requirements.
Structural defects, inadequate sanitation, dampness and unsafe living conditions should not escape regulatory scrutiny merely because the accommodation provider successfully establishes that the arrangement is a licence.
Student welfare and statutory jurisdiction are distinct legal considerations. Both require appropriate protection under the law.
THE UNITED KINGDOM'S APPROACH TO STUDENT ACCOMMODATION
The United Kingdom provides useful guidance on how legislation can recognise student accommodation as a distinct category without placing it beyond regulation.
In England, paragraph 8 of Schedule 1 to the Housing Act 1988 excludes qualifying student accommodation from the assured-tenancy regime.
The exclusion is based on specified statutory conditions rather than a general assumption that students cannot be tenants.
The distinction is important. An accommodation agreement may constitute a tenancy in law without necessarily attracting the statutory security of tenure applicable to ordinary assured tenancies.
The Renters' Rights Act 2025, with relevant reforms introduced in 2026, further recognises the peculiar character of student accommodation.
Qualifying university halls and purpose-built student accommodation may be excluded from the assured-tenancy regime where prescribed conditions are satisfied, including applicable requirements concerning approved accommodation management codes.
Ordinary private residential premises occupied by students are treated differently. The legislation also provides specific grounds upon which qualifying landlords may recover possession for subsequent student occupation.
The Housing Act 2004 establishes a framework for approved accommodation management codes addressing matters including safety, maintenance and complaints.
The significance of these statutory arrangements is that student accommodation is recognised according to its institutional purpose and operational characteristics.
The law does not need to deny the existence of a tenancy merely to accommodate the academic calendar. Instead, it expressly determines which categories of student accommodation should attract statutory protections.
Equally, exemption from ordinary tenancy protection does not excuse accommodation providers from compliance with applicable safety and management standards.
The circumstances under which the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), was enacted bear little resemblance to the present university accommodation system. At the time, student accommodation was largely provided through traditional halls of residence, publicly funded and administered as part of university life. The modern hostel industry, characterised by private investment, substantial accommodation fees and corporate management structures, emerged several decades later.
Although the language of Act 220 may extend to certain hostel arrangements, it would be difficult to suggest that the peculiarities of today's commercial student accommodation were specifically contemplated by its framers. The legislation makes no express provision for the relationship between academic-year occupation, statutory tenancy protection, institutional discipline and recovery of possession.
These omissions do not place university hostels beyond the law. They reveal the limitations of applying a general residential tenancy regime to accommodation provided principally for educational purposes.
There is therefore a compelling case for a targeted review of Act 220 and the Rent Control Act, 1986 (PNDCL 138), to recognise student accommodation as a distinct regulatory category. Such reform should distinguish university-managed residences, purpose-built private hostels and ordinary residential premises occupied by students, while clarifying the legal consequences of academic-year accommodation agreements and the circumstances in which possession may be recovered.
The revised framework should also establish enforceable standards for accommodation, transparent fee structures, maintenance obligations, inspection powers and accessible complaints procedures. Any special statutory treatment should be conditional upon compliance with prescribed standards to prevent ordinary landlords from avoiding tenancy obligations merely by describing their properties as student hostels.
The United Kingdom provides a useful example of how student accommodation can be treated differently from conventional residential tenancies without sacrificing essential legal protections.
The objective of reform is to establish a legal framework that reflects the distinctive character of student accommodation while protecting the legitimate interests of both students and accommodation providers.
The present controversy raises two distinct legal questions: whether university hostel arrangements constitute tenancies within the meaning of Act 220, and whether the Rent Control Department possesses the statutory authority to regulate the particular arrangements in dispute. Both questions must be determined by reference to the relevant legislation, the terms of the accommodation agreements and the substantive rights and obligations of the parties.
The absence of an express exemption for university hostels does not necessarily bring every accommodation arrangement within the Rent Act. Equally, the institutional character of student accommodation cannot, by itself, displace statutory protections where a tenancy exists. The Department's regulatory powers must also be exercised within the limits prescribed by law.
Beyond the resolution of these questions lies a legitimate case for legislative reform. Although existing legislation may apply to particular hostel arrangements, it does not adequately address the distinctive legal consequences of academic-year occupation, institutional management and the commercial provision of student accommodation.
The appropriate legislative response is neither a blanket exemption for university hostels nor an indiscriminate extension of conventional tenancy regulation. It is a clearly defined statutory framework that reconciles the legitimate operational requirements of accommodation providers with enforceable rights and protections for students.
The present dispute may be resolved through judicial interpretation of the existing legislation. Its broader implications, however, call for legislative intervention. Parliament should take the opportunity to clarify the legal status of student accommodation and the corresponding rights, obligations and regulatory powers, thereby providing the certainty which the present statutory framework lacks.
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