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1966, civil war and beyond: Gowon’s unpleasant echoes of the past! By Olu Fasan

1966, civil war and beyond: Gowon’s unpleasant echoes of the past! By Olu Fasan

Today, some Igbos still argue that, with that statement, Awolowo misled Ojukwu into declaring secession, ignoring the statement’s key proviso. Although Gowon rather conveniently seized on Awolowo’s comment to justify his action, his interpretation of the remark is more accurate and reasonable than any reading implying Awolowo supported Ojukwu’s declaration of secession.

This is the last of my three-part commentary on General Yakubu Gowon’s memoirs, My Life of Duty & Allegiance. My focus this week is on the most challenging parts of the memoirs, namely, the 1966 coups, the civil war, Gowon’s overthrow as head of state, and his treatment following allegations of complicity in the abortive coup that led to the overthrow and death of then head of state General Murtala Muhammed.

General Gowon’s accounts of these events reflect very unpleasant echoes of the past. Although he says that “by choosing to write, I made a conscious decision not to reopen old wounds”, he does exactly that, with unsavoury views, particularly on Emeka Ojukwu, Murtala Muhammed and Olusegun Obasanjo. Unsurprisingly, several Igbo commentators have strongly condemned Gowon’s accounts of the civil war, with some calling him a “liar”.

But those Igbos must admit that it’s such a shame Ojukwu died without writing his own memoirs. As it is, the last words on the 1966 coups, the civil war and its aftermath are those of Gowon, who was Army Chief of Staff during the 1966 events, and head of state during the civil war. With Ojukwu not alive to rebut Gowon, and not having left behind his memoirs, it’s hard for anyone to dismiss Gowon’s assessment of Ojukwu out of hand.

And Gowon’s assessment is unsparing! Truth be told, the civil war was a war of conflicting egos, fuelled by a deep rivalry between two proud leaders: Gowon and Ojukwu. Under different leaders, the war, perhaps, would not have happened. But Ojukwu loathed Gowon and refused to recognise his leadership, insisting he was his senior in the army hierarchy.

On his part, Gowon viewed Ojukwu as a politically ambitious and disloyal officer who always had coup motives. Indeed, according to Gowon, the precursor to the January 15, 1966 coup was Ojukwu’s earlier plan in 1964 to intervene militarily in favour of Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, the titular president, in the dispute between him and Sir Tafawa Balewa, the prime minister, over the controversial 1964 general elections.

Gowon also cites a report that “suggested Ojukwu knew about the (January 15, 1966) coup and might have been involved in it.” The absence of friendship or mutual respect, let alone trust, between them thwarted well-meaning efforts to prevent the war! Interestingly, both parties somewhat used Chief Obafemi Awolowo’s statement to justify fighting the war.

In May 1967, two months before the war began, Chief Awolowo told a meeting of the Western Leaders of Thought in Ibadan: “If the Eastern Region is allowed by acts of omission or commission to secede from or opt out of Nigeria, then the Western Region and Lagos must also stay out of the Federation.” Today, some Igbos still argue that, with that statement, Awolowo misled Ojukwu into declaring secession, ignoring the statement’s key proviso.

But for Gowon, Chief Awolowo’s remark gave him the resolve to stop the attempted secession. “At the back of my mind,” Gowon writes, “I remembered Chief Awolowo’s statement.” He adds: “Rather than interpret it as a tacit support for the disintegration of Nigeria, I inverted the thrust of the remark within the context of a united Nigeria and took it as a challenge to do everything to prevent a breakup of our nation ‘by any act of omission or commission’”.

Although Gowon rather conveniently seized on Awolowo’s comment to justify his action, his interpretation of the remark is more accurate and reasonable than any reading implying Awolowo supported Ojukwu’s declaration of secession. That stretches credulity! But that’s not the first time Gowon would read Awolowo’s statements or actions differently from how some Igbos read them.

For instance, he goes to great lengths to defend Awolowo against his statement that “all is fair in war and starvation is one of the weapons of war.” Gowon argues that “the machinery of rebel propaganda deliberately took the statement out of its proper context,” adding: “Chief Awolowo’s Christian faith was as good as his politics, and he subscribed to the injunction of Christ to feed or give water to one’s hungry and thirsty enemy.” The invocation of Awolowo’s Christian faith is rather too defensive given that the statement, read in full, suggests he didn’t, in principle, object to using starvation as a weapon of war, even though, as Gowon insists, starvation was never a strategy of the Nigerian side.

As I wrote last week, Chief Awolowo could be described as the hero of General Gowon’s memoirs, considering how glowingly he writes about him and how stoutly he defends him, including against another accusation that Awolowo gave only 20 Nigerian pounds to all returning Igbos after the war. Gowon writes: “Despite the passing of time, pseudo-historians continue to blame Chief Awolowo for the after effect of the federal government’s post-war currency control policy”, adding that “the final decision was not Chief Awolowo’s”.

It seems as if Gowon wrote the memoirs not only to defend himself, but also to defend C

  • gowon
  • war
  • ojukwu
  • awolowo
  • statement
  • coup
  • chief
  • past

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