Full text of the inaugural Cornelia Sorabji Memorial Lecture delivered by Supreme Court Justice B.V. Nagarathna

Only the practice of substantive equality could take care of these differences among women hailing from and living through diverse life experiences, the Judge said.
In this image received on Nov. 19, 2026, Supreme Court Judge, Justice BV Nagarathna delivers the inaugural Cornelia Sorabji Memorial Lecture at Somerville College, University of Oxford, England, on November 18, 2026.
Justice B.V. Nagarathna, one of the senior most judges of the Supreme Court and in line to be the first woman Chief Justice of India, has said that the mere existence of women in high public office does not establish that equality has been achieved throughout society.
“A woman may hold a senior position while other women remain excluded from education, employment, property, or effective legal remedies,” Justice Nagarathna said at the inaugural Cornelia Sorabji Memorial Lecture at Somerville College in the University of Oxford on Wednesday (November 18, 2026).
Below is the full text of the inaugural Cornelia Sorabji Memorial Lecture delivered by Hon’ble Mrs. Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Judge, Supreme Court of India at Oxford India Centre for Sustainable Development (OICSD), Somerville College, University of Oxford
Title: “The Doors She Opened: Cornelia Sorabji and the Progress of Women’s Rights in India.”
It is a profound honour to deliver the inaugural Cornelia Sorabji Memorial Lecture at Somerville College. This is a place whose history is inseparable from the struggle to secure women’s rightful place in institutions of higher learning.
I congratulate Somerville for instituting the Lecture series in memory of Cornelia and thank the organisers for this invitation. I say so for the opportunity it affords to reflect upon a question that is at once historical, constitutional, and deeply contemporary: how has the law in India moved from a feudal system in which women were frequently the objects of legal protection to a constitutional order in which they are recognised as equal bearers of rights?
There could scarcely be a more fitting place for this reflection than Somerville. It was here, in 1889, that Cornelia Sorabji arrived to study law. She was the first woman to read law at Oxford and the first Indian woman to study at a British University. She passed her examinations in 1892, but could not receive the degree to which her achievement entitled her, until women became eligible for Oxford degrees three decades later.
That gives this inaugural lecture a particular significance.
The argument I propose to put forth today is that the history of women’s rights in India is a history of three interrelated transformations.
The first was the transformation of women’s legal status: from persons whose rights were frequently mediated through family, custom, and community into individuals entitled to claim rights in their own names.
The second was the transformation of the Constitution from a guarantee of formal equality into an instrument for confronting structural disadvantage, gender stereotypes, and institutional exclusion.
The third is the transformation of the idea of justice itself: from a predominantly individual remedy against a particular wrong into a constitutional commitment to reconstruct the social, economic, and institutional relationships.
But first of all, I will begin by speaking about Cornelia Sorabji, whose life stands at the threshold of history which I propose to trace during the course of this lecture.
Cornelia Sorabji was born in Nasik (now Nashik) on 15th November 1866 into a family that valued education. She excelled academically. She became the first woman to graduate from University of Bombay. She read English Literature at Deccan College, Poona (now Pune), and stood first. Pune’s long association with education and the advancement of women in public life may have been an early influence on the young Cornelia Sorabji.
This educational achievement led her towards the legal profession in which women were not ordinarily permitted to participate on equal terms.
Her journey to study law at Oxford was itself an illustration of the exclusion she sought to overcome. Despite her academic merit, she was denied the government scholarship for which she would otherwise have qualified because she was a woman.1 She passed her examinations in 1892, but was not awarded a degree, as Oxford did not then confer degrees upon women. She did receive her Oxford degree in 1922, thirty years after passing her examinations, when the University finally permitted women to graduate.2 In 1892, Cornelia Sorabji became the first woman to pass the Civil Law examinations at Oxford. Yet her academic achievement did not translate into a right to practise in India.
In 1916, Regina Guha’s application for enrolment as a pleader was rejected by a five-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court.3 The governing legislation was the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879.
The legal position was eventually altered through legislative intervention which culminated in the enactment of the Legal Practitioners (Women) Act, 1923, which opened the profession to women by removing the statutory barrier based on sex.4 Sorabji subsequently became the first woman vakil in India.
We should understand the significance of Sorabji’s experience carefully.
She confronted gender barriers to education and professional recognition, pioneered legal assistance for women whose circumstances left them particularly vulnerable especially pardanashin ladies and helped demonstrate the importance of access to law.5
Such individual interventions may break glass ceilings and are worth celebrating. But, in my view, the structural inequalities governing the lives of women as a class can only be addressed by constitutional guarantees.
The history of women’s intellectual and cultural agency in India actually predates the modern reform movement. The Vedic tradition remembers Gargi and Maitreyi as scholars of Vedas and as important participants in philosophical debates and discourse of the time; the Buddhist tradition records Gotami, the first woman admitted to the Buddhist monastic order, as an important influence on religious doctrine; the Bhakti traditions also produced scholarly figures such as Andal, Akka Mahadevi and Mirabai, whose literary and religious authority endured well beyond their lifetimes.6 In the Mughal period, too, Gulbadan Begum, author of the Humayun-nama — a landmark text in the whole of South Asian historiography, and Nur Jahan, the de facto Emperor for much of Jehangir’s life, both demonstrate women’s participation in intellectual and political life in India.7 The lives of all these women do point out that women’s agency in Indian history was not absent, but has often been rendered less visible in history. These examples caution against reading the history of Indian women as a simple linear progression from exclusion to emancipation.
To understand the modern period and the significance of the Indian Constitution, it is necessary to examine the legal and social conditions that preceded it. Women faced restrictions in education and in participation in public life. The extent and form of these disadvantages differed, but they raised a common question: to what extent could women exercise independent control over their lives and the resources necessary to sustain them?
The abolition of sati under the Bengal Sati Regulation of 1829,8 the Hindu Widows’ Remarriage Act of 1856,9 Age of Consent Act of 1891 ,10 Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929,11 reflected an increasing willingness to address certain practices through legislation rather than leaving them exclusively to family or community authority.
The Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 193712 sought to reform property relations.
The Mysore Hindu Law Women’s Rights Act, 1933, recognising women’s claims to shares in joint family property in specified circumstances13 provided for specified female relatives, including mother, unmarried daughter and a widow, to a share in joint family property at a partition.
These developments formed part of the legal and social background against which the Constitution’s guarantees of equality and the subsequent reform of laws governing women’s rights must be understood.
Women’s organisations helped shift the terms of reform from the amelioration of particular social practices towards a broader examination of the legal, economic, and political conditions governing women’s lives.
This development must also be situated within the international movement for women’s rights which raised fundamental questions about the relationshi between representation, equality, and democratic government.14
The Constitution’s commitment to equality emerged not in isolation, but against a background of sustained domestic mobilisation and transnational intellectual exchange.
The Indian Women’s Charter of Rights and Duties, drafted by Hansa Mehta and accepted by the All India Women’s Conference in 1946, articulated a broad vision of equal citizenship, political representation, educational opportunity, and social responsibility.
The movement towards constitutional equality was thus already under way before the Constitution was adopted. The Republic inherited not a blank slate, but a body of reform legislation, organised women’s activism and a growing conviction that political freedom would remain incomplete without the emancipation of women.
The Indian Constitution’s transformative ambition was also shaped by the women who participated in the Constituent Assembly. It is in this context that we must remember the contribution of the women members of the Constituent Assembly.
Fifteen women were members of the Assembly. They included Hansa Mehta, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, Durgabai Deshmukh, Dakshayani Velayudhan, Sarojini Naidu whose contributions deserve to be restored to the centre of constitutional history.
These women understood that women’s equality was inseparable from the larger question of how the Republic would define citizenship.
Rajkumari Amrit Kaur in 1932 at Jalandhar, said, and I quote:
“The women of India are no longer willing to submit to standards, whether local, political or ethical, which have been set for them by the male conscience ofthe community; we are passionately aware that such standards have often been allowed to imply the complete subordination or even degradation of whole classes of women; we are aware of the necessity of finding and being judged by our own standards of free human beings, voluntarily accepted; we are determined to face the facts of life, to fight the battles ofour sex and take the risks.”15
Hansa Mehta’s interventions are also instructive. The presence of a few distinguished women in public life, she observed, in substance, could not represent the actual position of the average Indian woman.16
Renuka Ray’s work was on Hindu law reform17.
Durgabai Deshmukh’s interventions concerning social reform, education, and access to public institutions reveal another dimension of this constitutional imagination.18
Dakshayani Velayudhan brought the experience of caste oppression into the Assembly’s deliberations.19
It is against this background that I must now turn to the text of the Constitution itself, to examine how the aspirations articulated by these women found expression in its guarantees.
The Preamble to the Indian Constitution, inter alia, promises justice—social, economic, and political—and equality of status and opportunity. These are not merely aspirational phrases detached from the operative provisions of the Constitution.
Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws.20 while Article 21 has become central to the judicial recognition of dignity, privacy, bodily integrity, and personal autonomy.21 The Directive Principles of State Policy reinforce these commitments. These provisions must be read together.
This constitutional arrangement reflects a distinction between formal equality and substantive equality. The distinction is indispensable to the history of women’s rights. For women, this insight is particularly important. Discrimination often arises within families, workplaces, educational institutions, and professional organisations. The Constitution’s transformative potential lies in its ability to challenge the conditions under which inequality is maintained.
It has supplied the principles through which the inherited legal and social order could be examined, challenged, and reconstructed.
The decades after 1950 reveal two parallel histories: the legislature’s attempt to reform substantive areas of law, and the judiciary’s gradual development of constitutional principles capable of scrutinising those reforms as also the exclusions that remained.
The movement towards comprehensive reform of personal laws gathered momentum in the twentieth century. In 1941 , the colonial government appointed the Hindu Law Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. B.N. Rau to examine the codification of Hindu personal law.22
The Hindu Code Bill, developed through the work of the Rau Committee and subsequently advanced under the leadership of Dr B.R. Ambedkar, as Law Minister, sought to codify and reform several branches of Hindu personal law.23
In succession of property, for example, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 initially retained the Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary system under which daughters were not recognised as coparceners in joint family property. The Amendment to the Act in 2005, however, fundamentally altered this position, making a daughter coparcener by birth with the same rights in joint family property as a son. In Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma, (2020)24, the Supreme Court confirmed that this right, being by birth, does not depend on the father being alive when the amendment came into force. The law has thus moved from treating daughters as secondary claimants to recognising them as equal sharers in joint family property.
The same interaction between constitutional principle and statutory reform appears in labour law. The Maternity Benefit Act, 196125 and the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, addressed other dimensions of workplace inequality.26
The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 , sought to prohibit the giving and taking of dowry.27
Surely, these statutes did not end discrimination. They reveal the limits of legislation where social attitudes, unequal bargaining power, and inadequate implementation continue to obstruct the exercise of rights.
The Supreme Court, in earlier decades of independence, did not always adopt an expansive approach to equality. Some judgments accepted distinctions based on prevailing social assumptions about the roles of men and women.
In Yusuf Abdul Aziz vs. State of Bombay (1954)28,the Supreme Court considered the constitutional validity of Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, which criminalised adultery by punishing a man who had sexual intercourse with another man’s wife without that husband’s consent or connivance, while exempting the woman from punishment for the same.
A more troubling contrast appeared in Air India vs. Nergesh Meerza (1981)29.In that case, the Supreme Court examined service regulations that required air hostesses to retire at the age of 35 years, provided for termination from service if they married within the first four years of service, and/or upon their first pregnancy. The Court struck down only automatic termination upon first pregnancy as arbitrary under Article 14. The judgment illustrates the limits of the Court’s approach to equality.
C.B. Muthamma vs. Union of India (1979)30, provides an important counterpoint to the Court’s otherwise predominant approach as outlined above. The Supreme Court, in a judgment authored by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer observed that if domestic commitments could interfere with a woman’s work, the same possibility existed for a man, and that marriage could not, without more, justify imposing restrictions exclusively on women.
In Githa Hariharan vs. Reserve Bank of India (1999)31,the Supreme Court considered the gendered hierarchy embedded in Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, which designated the father as the natural guardian of a minor child and recognised the mother as guardian “after him”. The Court interpreted the provision in a manner that curtailed its discriminatory effect.
The more liberal phase of the Supreme Court’s women’s-rights jurisprudence cannot be understood merely as a succession of progressive judgments.
The Supreme Court realised that a woman’s liberty is not meaningful if economic dependence or violence prevents her from exercising personal choice.
In Mohd. Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum & Ors. (1985)32, the Supreme Court considered the entitlement of a divorced Muslim woman to maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court held that Section 125, a secular provision designed to prevent destitution, applied to a divorced Muslim woman who had not remarried.
The judgment generated substantial political controversy.
Parliament subsequently enacted the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 with the view to undo the said judgment.
In Danial Latifi vs. Union of India (2001)33,the Supreme Court rather than invalidating the legislation interpreted it to preserve meaningful financial protection for divorced Muslim women.
The issue returned to the Supreme Court in Mohd. Abdul Samad vs. State of Telangana (2025)34,of which I was a part. The Court clarified that the 1986 Act was in addition to, and not in derogation of, Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
One of the clearest examples of the interaction between international feminist thought and Indian constitutional law is Vishaka vs. State of Rajasthan (1997)35. Women’s organisations approached the Supreme Court through public interest litigation, seeking protection against sexual harassment at the workplace in the absence of statutory law on the point.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Verma, C.J., laid down, what came to be called, the Vishaka Guidelines. These guidelines operated until Parliament enacted the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.36
This is also a particularly important example of the two parallel histories we have been tracing: judicial interpretation opened a path and legislative action later institutionalised the protection offered by courts.
The movement from formal equality to substantive equality became especially visible in Anuj Garg vs. Hotel Assn. of India (2008)37. The case concerned a provision of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, that prohibited women from being employed during the night hours in premises where liquor was served to the public.
The Court’s approach challenged what may be described as protective paternalism: the practice of restricting women’s freedom in the name of protecting them.
The constitutional scrutiny of gendered assumptions is equally evident in a recent judgment of the Supreme Court which incidentally I authored in Assn. of Old Settlers of Sikkim vs. Union of India (2023)38. The Court was presented with a provision of the Income Tax Act, 1961 , that denied a Sikkimese woman an exemption available to other Sikkimese individuals if she married a non-Sikkimese after 01 April 2008. The Court struck down the provision and cast aside the discriminatory premise that a woman’s marital choice could alter her legal identity and entitlements. As the Court recognised, marriage does not extinguish a woman’s independent identity nor can it be a basis for discrimination.
Women’s economic participation has been another area in which the constitutional promise of equality has been tested.
Women were expected to combine paid work with the principal responsibility for household labour and childcare. This assumption is not without economic and legal consequences.
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