Russia in Africa: What is Putin hoping to achieve?

The conflict with the West sparked by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine prompted Russian President Vladimir Putin to seek support from other parts of the world. Africa has become a focus, with foreign minister Sergei Lavrov visiting the continent increasingly often.

Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova has described it as a "historic return," and declared no one and nothing could be compared to what Russia did for Africa in the 20th century.

A Russia-Africa summit has been held in Russia at roughly three-year intervals since 2019. The third takes place in Moscow on October 28 and 29. The program focusses on economic cooperation. Other topics range from politics and security to science and culture. But Russia is actively working with only a few African countries, mainly in the north of the continent, and this is reflected in the trade figures.

"South Africa is still Africa's largest national economy, but its volume of trade with Russia is small, far less than with Egypt and Algeria," says Ivan Klyszcz from the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) in Tallinn, Estonia.

"Egypt and Algeria in particular are key partners for Russia. Egypt plays an important role in this regard. Russian diplomats and business representatives are trying to extend relationships with other countries, especially Tanzania and Ethiopia, but with no appreciable success so far."

Egypt is the second-largest economy in Africa, and the bilateral volume of trade with Russia has more than doubled since 2021; in 2025, according to Russia's Federal Customs Service, it was $10.5 billion (€9.4 billion). Consignments of Russian grain are the main drivers, followed by products of the metal industry. Egypt's exports to Russia are primarily fruit and vegetables.

There are investment projects, too. Russia is building a big nuclear power plant in the Egyptian region of El-Dabaa on the Mediterranean coast. Construction is being financed by a Russian loan of 25 billion US dollars, which covers around 85% of the costs.

Egypt is one of the few African countries with which Russia enjoys stable business relationships, as well as having extensive experience of cooperation, says Nikita Smagin, an expert on Russian policy in the Middle East. "In the long term, Egypt could become Moscow's gateway to Africa and to other markets," he says. "But Cairo is pursuing its own interests. It would be too optimistic to hope that Egypt is lending its support purely out of political solidarity."

According to the Russian customs service, around 39% of Russian–African trade in 2025 was with Egypt, and total sales between Russia and all 54 countries of the African continent came to around 27 billion US dollars. Africa's share of Russia's foreign trade is therefore very small (3.9% in 2025), and not at all commensurate with the attention Moscow is devoting to its relations with African countries.

Russia is not a significant trading partner for Africa, either. The most important partner for African countries is the European Union. In 2025, the volume of trade with the EU came to around 385 billion US dollars. African countries' statistics also show that other partners were well ahead of Russia. The volume of trade with China was in excess of 348 billion US dollars in 2025; with the United States it was almost 105 billion, and 103 billion with India.

Fidel Owusu, a Ghanaian expert with Geopolitical Intelligence Services (GIS) in Liechtenstein, comments that Russia's economic presence in Africa has not been as significant as that of China, the United States, India, or other traditional powers like France and Britain. "If you look at the volume of trade and the kind of investment," he says, "in recent times, some middle powers such as Turkey and the UAW are doing far better than Russia."

Beverly Ochieng, a senior analyst with Control Risks, a global risk and strategic intelligence consultancy in Senegal, observes: "Western countries continue to dominate in strategically important areas such as raw material extraction, finance, and the energy sector, even if their political presence in the region is declining." According to her, "Russia will compete more intensively for access to critical mineral resources and energy projects. We see this with lithium projects in Mali as well as with nuclear power initiatives across the continent."

Russia's presence in Africa is more obvious in the military sector than in the fields of trade and investment. Starting with the arrival of the Wagner Group, Russian mercenaries have been supporting African regimes, particularly those of the unstable countries in the Sahel region. In exchange, their associated subsidiaries are granted access to raw materials. Following the death of the Wagner Group leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, most of these operations were taken over by the Africa Corps, a paramilitary group set up and controlled by Russia's defense ministry.

According to the Congressional Research Service, the think tank of the US Congress, the largest Russian military contingents, each comprising several thousand men, are in the Central African Republic, Mali, and Libya. The Africa Corps is also keen to extend its presence in Burkina Faso and Niger. Russian mercenaries have also been spotted in Equatorial Guinea.

Irina Filatova from the University of Cape Town stresses that there are several reasons why it's important for Russia to maintain a military presence in Africa. "The countries have sizeable deposits of minerals such as gold and uranium. Through them, it's possible to exert influence over Europe's southern borders, including in matters of migration and regional security. With regard to Libya, the country is an important logistical hub for connections with the Sahel and central Africa. Goods can easily be supplied via Libya to countries without access to the sea," Filatova says.

Ultimately, Russia is still one of the biggest suppliers of arms to African countries, even though Russian exports have fallen over the course of the war in Ukraine. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates Moscow's share of the African market for the years 2021–2025 at 15%, which puts it in third place behind the United States (19%) and China (17%). Between 2020 and 2024, its share was even higher: It was in first place with 21%, followed by China with 18%, and the US with 16%.

Ivan Klyszcz from the ICDS says that while Russia is not a significant economic partner for Africa, the fact that it supplies food and fertilizer and has a military presence in some countries means that Moscow's influence in Africa is far greater than is suggested by the volume of trade and investment alone.

"I believe Russia sees the diplomatic weight of Africa," says Fidel Owusu. "When I talk of diplomatic weight, I mean numbers – the continent has the largest number of countries. Russia wants that kind of support in the UN General Assembly whenever votes are cast. In recent times it has done better than in earlier votes."

In recent years, Russia has been positioning itself on the international stage as representing the interests of the Global South.

"We want to work with Africa, we are working with Africa and we will continue to do so. But our aim is not, as it was for the colonial powers, to make money or steal something from Africa, but to develop together," Russian president Vladimir Putin said recently at a conference of the Moscow-based Valdai Discussion Club.

References to the colonial past appeal to some countries but not others, says Irina Filatova. "Africa is not a country, it's a continent. There are differences in the perception of Russia, as well as in the way Russia positions itself. Also, the views of the political elites are often substantially different from those of ordinary citizens. In South Africa, for instance, the Russian narrative is received very positively. An anti-colonial agenda is also popular in other countries, but it isn't necessarily associated with Russia."

Antonio Cascais contributed to this report. It was originally written in Russian.