At least 7.9 million punished in Xi's fight to keep party going

The revolving door at the top of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has taken a startling turn this week. After a purge of senior generals, only two of the seven members of China's Central Military Commission remain, including President Xi Jinping.

By leaving five purged seats unfilled, there are major gaps in the supreme military command, raising questions about China's ambitious military expansion while its core decision-makers remain unsettled.

The shift is part of Xi's latest sweeping campaign to enforce party discipline "in all-round ways".

Now in its 14th year, Xi's signature anti-corruption movement, targeting "tigers and flies", has punished at least 7.9 million CCP members and officials for alleged corruption.

At the fifth plenum of the CCP's 20th Central Committee this week, 33 members and alternate members were expelled from the party, including 16 from the military.

The scale of the purge is unprecedented in nearly half a century, with a record number of empty seats leaving the committee smaller than usual.

It raises a significant question that Xi has to confront: is it a sign of systematic strength or failure?

The CCP is widely considered one of the largest political parties in the world, with a highly complex organisational structure.

Building and managing a party with more than 100 million members is a tricky task; it was one of the "three magic weapons" Mao Zedong identified as crucial to the party's success.

The plenum this year further reinforced Xi's position at the centre of the party, linking strict discipline to his political will.

Xi is widely expected to seek an unprecedented fourth term as the CCP's general secretary at the next congress of the party in the second half of 2027.

Since he took the helm, China watchers have often viewed his anti-corruption campaign as a tool for removing his rivals. But it has also reached figures close to him, including former foreign minister Qin Gang, and powerful establishment figures like senior military leader Zhang Youxia.

Even when the purge reaches into his own circle, it helps Xi to reinforce his authority and legitimise his continued grip on power.

"If I were to put in absolute terms, I would say his next term is 100 per cent," said Deng Yuwen, former editor of a communist party newspaper.

While the party operates under an authoritarian system, it has a long history of internal rivalries that have helped shape power balances for decades.

Xi's latest moves suggest he is further centralising his power to contain risks and keep its members firmly under control.

"Fighting corruption is only one part of the equation," said Chen Minglu, associate professor of Chinese politics at the University of Sydney.

"It is also about the party's governing capacity, its relationship with the people, and ensuring that central government policies are implemented."

What remains uncertain is how this centralisation will reshape the CCP's long-standing competitions between provincial officials and within the Politburo, the country's political apparatus.

The party expelled three former Politburo members this week. It created vacancies at the top, opening opportunities for lower-ranking talents to rise.

Xi may use this to allow the party to renew its leadership without necessarily challenging his authority, meaning it becomes harder to express opposition in the country's political system.

This is the second of Mao's magic weapons.

Xi's military mission has shifted from seizing political power to maintaining national security and defending the CCP's rule. Taiwan, of course, is one of the most politically significant objectives in this context.

For Xi, achieving national reunification is not only a matter of China's territorial claims, but is also closely linked to the Chinese Dream he advocates, the realisation of "national rejuvenation".

The plenum emphasised accelerating the modernisation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and continuing the party's work on Taiwan.

However, Xi's ongoing purge of military figures raises a practical question about whether the strengthening of political loyalty comes at the cost of military effectiveness.

With the 100th anniversary of the PLA approaching in 2027, the power vacuum in its command structure also raises questions about the military's readiness to achieve Xi's ambition.

"Xi will seek to resolve the Taiwan question. That does not necessarily mean Taiwan will have been reunified with the mainland by the time he leaves office, but the direction is firmly confirmed," Deng said.

If this assessment holds true, Deng added, this week's purge could also be aimed at ensuring the system is politically aligned with Xi's objectives in any future conflict.

At the very least, Xi is demonstrating his determination to ensure the military's long-term obedience to the party's political objectives.

The risk, however, is the system becomes increasingly dependent on him.

French soccer star Kylian Mbappé apologised this week after referring to Mao as "a Chinese dictator", unexpectedly putting the party's third magic weapon, the united front, to a real-world test.

The incident coincided with the plenum, bringing renewed attention to Mao's nearly 27-year rule and its implications for the party's authority during one of China's most politically sensitive periods of the year.

The controversy shows how the party can frame criticism of its political narrative as an "insult" to the Chinese people, rallying public sentiment against external critics.

For the CCP, upholding the party's authority and controlling its narrative is not only a matter of domestic stability, but also shapes China's image on the international stage.

Although Mbappé's remark was casual, it touched the most sensitive nerve in China. Criticism of Mao can potentially invite scrutiny of Xi's unlimited presidential terms.

It resulted in Mbappé being cancelled by Chinese commercial partners, state-owned broadcasters and sports platforms. It shows how the party's influence can be extended beyond China's borders, with the Chinese market serving as a source of pressure on foreign individuals and institutions.

The united front, championed by Mao, was originally a key strategy for the CCP to win over domestic communities and unite political allies.

In recent years, concerns have grown in the West about whether such efforts can also be used to exert political influence beyond China's borders.

"The fundamental principle of the united front is to unite all the forces that can be united. China is increasingly recognising the importance of making friends rather than creating enemies," Chen said.

However, seeking recognition and demanding adherence to a specific political narrative are two very different goals.

When criticism of Mao is viewed as a confronting statement to the Chinese people, as China's foreign ministry said this week, Beijing is blurring the line between the party, China and the Chinese people.

It allows the party to use political pressure and public sentiment as tools to uphold the line.

The plenum's emphasis on comprehensive and strict party governance and upholding the centralised leadership of Xi reflected the CCP's direction of managing risks and maintaining political order.

It is unlikely to solve the trust issue between the party, the Chinese public and international society.