Enlarge / Illustration of a smallpox (smallpox) virus. A (transparent) membrane derived from its host cell covers the virus particle. Inside is the nucleus (green), which contains the particle's DNA genetic material. The nucleus has a biconcave shape.
Katerya Kon/Science Photo Library via Getty
In November 2016, virologist David Evans traveled to Geneva for a meeting of a World Health Organization committee on smallpox research. The deadly virus had been declared eradicated 36 years earlier; the only known live samples of smallpox were in the custody of the US and Russian governments.
Evans, however, made a startling announcement: months before the meeting, he and a colleague had created a close relative of the smallpox virus, effectively from scratch, in their lab in Canada. In a later report, the WHO wrote that the team's method "did not require exceptional biochemical knowledge or skill, significant funds or considerable time".
Evans disagrees with this characterization: The process "takes a huge amount of technical skill," he told Undark. But some technologies have made the experience easier. In particular, Evans and his colleague were able to simply order long stretches of virus DNA by mail, from GeneArt, a subsidiary of Thermo Fisher Scientific.
If DNA is the code for life, then groups like GeneArt are print shops: they synthesize custom DNA strands and ship them to scientists, who can use the DNA to make a yeast cell in the dark or to create a plastic. -eat a bacterium, or build a virus from scratch. There are now dozens, if not hundreds, of companies selling genes, offering DNA at increasingly lower prices. (If DNA looks like a long text, today's rates are often less than 10 cents a letter; at that rate, the genetic material needed to start building a flu virus would cost less than $1,500.) New benchtop technologies - essentially, portable gene printers - promise to make synthetic DNA even more widely available.
But, since at least the 2000s, the field has been clouded by fear that someone is using these services to cause harm, specifically to make a deadly virus and use it to commit an act of bioterrorism.< /p>
Meanwhile, the United States imposes few safety regulations on synthetic DNA suppliers. It is perfectly legal to make a batch of Ebola or smallpox genes and ship it to a US address, no questions asked, although creating the virus from that genetic material may be illegal under laws governing the possession of certain pathogens.
Whether this is a legitimate cause for concern is up for debate. Some experts say creating a virus from synthetic DNA remains extremely difficult for most scientists and fears of an attack are often exaggerated. At the same time, new nonprofit initiatives, fueled by money from Silicon Valley philanthropists, and sometimes evoking worst-case scenarios, are pushing for stronger protections against the misuse of synthetic DNA. However, implementing effective security is difficult, as is enforcing any kind of standard in a sprawling multinational industry.
“It's not that I'm worried about anything happening tomorrow. with them, the ability of the recipients to then assemble the DNA fragments into a new virus,” said Gregory Koblentz, a biodefense researcher at George Mason University. we really should be more proactive and try to be one step ahead."
Kevin Esvelt, a biotechnologist at MIT, is perhaps the most prominent scientist warning about the danger of uncontrolled DNA synthesis. In the conversation, Esvelt quickly moves from technical detail to Cassandra-style alarm. He often talks about Seiichi Endo, a Japanese virologist who in 1987 joined the doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo. Endo helped carry out a poison gas attack on the Tokyo subway, and the group attempted, but apparently failed, to obtain the Ebola virus.
Since then, the creation of pathogens has become easy...
Enlarge / Illustration of a smallpox (smallpox) virus. A (transparent) membrane derived from its host cell covers the virus particle. Inside is the nucleus (green), which contains the particle's DNA genetic material. The nucleus has a biconcave shape.
Katerya Kon/Science Photo Library via Getty
In November 2016, virologist David Evans traveled to Geneva for a meeting of a World Health Organization committee on smallpox research. The deadly virus had been declared eradicated 36 years earlier; the only known live samples of smallpox were in the custody of the US and Russian governments.
Evans, however, made a startling announcement: months before the meeting, he and a colleague had created a close relative of the smallpox virus, effectively from scratch, in their lab in Canada. In a later report, the WHO wrote that the team's method "did not require exceptional biochemical knowledge or skill, significant funds or considerable time".
Evans disagrees with this characterization: The process "takes a huge amount of technical skill," he told Undark. But some technologies have made the experience easier. In particular, Evans and his colleague were able to simply order long stretches of virus DNA by mail, from GeneArt, a subsidiary of Thermo Fisher Scientific.
If DNA is the code for life, then groups like GeneArt are print shops: they synthesize custom DNA strands and ship them to scientists, who can use the DNA to make a yeast cell in the dark or to create a plastic. -eat a bacterium, or build a virus from scratch. There are now dozens, if not hundreds, of companies selling genes, offering DNA at increasingly lower prices. (If DNA looks like a long text, today's rates are often less than 10 cents a letter; at that rate, the genetic material needed to start building a flu virus would cost less than $1,500.) New benchtop technologies - essentially, portable gene printers - promise to make synthetic DNA even more widely available.
But, since at least the 2000s, the field has been clouded by fear that someone is using these services to cause harm, specifically to make a deadly virus and use it to commit an act of bioterrorism.< /p>
Meanwhile, the United States imposes few safety regulations on synthetic DNA suppliers. It is perfectly legal to make a batch of Ebola or smallpox genes and ship it to a US address, no questions asked, although creating the virus from that genetic material may be illegal under laws governing the possession of certain pathogens.
Whether this is a legitimate cause for concern is up for debate. Some experts say creating a virus from synthetic DNA remains extremely difficult for most scientists and fears of an attack are often exaggerated. At the same time, new nonprofit initiatives, fueled by money from Silicon Valley philanthropists, and sometimes evoking worst-case scenarios, are pushing for stronger protections against the misuse of synthetic DNA. However, implementing effective security is difficult, as is enforcing any kind of standard in a sprawling multinational industry.
“It's not that I'm worried about anything happening tomorrow. with them, the ability of the recipients to then assemble the DNA fragments into a new virus,” said Gregory Koblentz, a biodefense researcher at George Mason University. we really should be more proactive and try to be one step ahead."
Kevin Esvelt, a biotechnologist at MIT, is perhaps the most prominent scientist warning about the danger of uncontrolled DNA synthesis. In the conversation, Esvelt quickly moves from technical detail to Cassandra-style alarm. He often talks about Seiichi Endo, a Japanese virologist who in 1987 joined the doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo. Endo helped carry out a poison gas attack on the Tokyo subway, and the group attempted, but apparently failed, to obtain the Ebola virus.
Since then, the creation of pathogens has become easy...
Enlarge / Illustration of a smallpox (smallpox) virus. A (transparent) membrane derived from its host cell covers the virus particle. Inside is the nucleus (green), which contains the particle's DNA genetic material. The nucleus has a biconcave shape.
Katerya Kon/Science Photo Library via Getty
