NASA helped find a security hole in spacecraft networks
NASA and University of Michigan researchers found a security flaw that would pose a risk to the spacecraft in right (or alternatively, wrong) situations. The team determined that Time-Triggered Ethernet (TTE), a function that important systems must take place alongside minor systems on the same network hardware, is susceptible to spoofing. . An intruder can send fake timing messages by performing electromagnetic interference through copper Ethernet cables in community switches, creating a "gap" in a switch's hobby that lets false information through. Over time, the TTE device will lose synchronization and behave inconsistently.
Aggression requires placing a small device on the community, so remote breaches are unlikely. However, the consequences could be serious. Scientists tested the vulnerability using real NASA equipment to recreate a . In a simulation, the TTE exploit produced a ripple effect high enough for the team pill to deviate from its direction and ignore an important docking manner.
There are simple guarantees, if not always trouble-free anymore. Vehicle designers should upgrade copper Ethernet with fiber optic cables or place optical isolators between switches and devices, as long as they are willing to accept cost and performance sacrifices. Engineers can also swap the layout of the network for you to prevent fake sync messages from going the same direction as valid messages, despite the fact that it will really take time.
NASA and the university strive to say that there is no recognized danger "nowadays". However, the approach can also be used to compromise aircraft, energy flora, and industrial manipulation systems that rely on TTE. Theoretically, a saboteur with physical access should in a way that might not be immediately apparent.
NASA and University of Michigan researchers found a security flaw that would pose a risk to the spacecraft in right (or alternatively, wrong) situations. The team determined that Time-Triggered Ethernet (TTE), a function that important systems must take place alongside minor systems on the same network hardware, is susceptible to spoofing. . An intruder can send fake timing messages by performing electromagnetic interference through copper Ethernet cables in community switches, creating a "gap" in a switch's hobby that lets false information through. Over time, the TTE device will lose synchronization and behave inconsistently.
Aggression requires placing a small device on the community, so remote breaches are unlikely. However, the consequences could be serious. Scientists tested the vulnerability using real NASA equipment to recreate a . In a simulation, the TTE exploit produced a ripple effect high enough for the team pill to deviate from its direction and ignore an important docking manner.
There are simple guarantees, if not always trouble-free anymore. Vehicle designers should upgrade copper Ethernet with fiber optic cables or place optical isolators between switches and devices, as long as they are willing to accept cost and performance sacrifices. Engineers can also swap the layout of the network for you to prevent fake sync messages from going the same direction as valid messages, despite the fact that it will really take time.
NASA and the university strive to say that there is no recognized danger "nowadays". However, the approach can also be used to compromise aircraft, energy flora, and industrial manipulation systems that rely on TTE. Theoretically, a saboteur with physical access should in a way that might not be immediately apparent.
All products recommended with the help of Engadget are selected by our editorial group, independent of our parent agency. Some of our stories include related links. If you purchase something through one of these links, we may also earn an affiliate commission. All prices correct at time of publication.
NASA and University of Michigan researchers found a security flaw that would pose a risk to the spacecraft in right (or alternatively, wrong) situations. The team determined that Time-Triggered Ethernet (TTE), a function that important systems must take place alongside minor systems on the same network hardware, is susceptible to spoofing. . An intruder can send fake timing messages by performing electromagnetic interference through copper Ethernet cables in community switches, creating a "gap" in a switch's hobby that lets false information through. Over time, the TTE device will lose synchronization and behave inconsistently.
Aggression requires placing a small device on the community, so remote breaches are unlikely. However, the consequences could be serious. Scientists tested the vulnerability using real NASA equipment to recreate a . In a simulation, the TTE exploit produced a ripple effect high enough for the team pill to deviate from its direction and ignore an important docking manner.
There are simple guarantees, if not always trouble-free anymore. Vehicle designers should upgrade copper Ethernet with fiber optic cables or place optical isolators between switches and devices, as long as they are willing to accept cost and performance sacrifices. Engineers can also swap the layout of the network for you to prevent fake sync messages from going the same direction as valid messages, despite the fact that it will really take time.
NASA and the university strive to say that there is no recognized danger "nowadays". However, the approach can also be used to compromise aircraft, energy flora, and industrial manipulation systems that rely on TTE. Theoretically, a saboteur with physical access should in a way that might not be immediately apparent.
All products recommended with the help of Engadget are selected by our editorial group, independent of our parent agency. Some of our stories include related links. If you purchase something through one of these links, we may also earn an affiliate commission. All prices correct at time of publication.
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