Chad's political transition behind schedule

Chad's political transition was supposed to last 18 months, from April 2021 to September 2022, but now it looks like an extension will be needed. The country struggles with internal and border security issues, severe food shortages and poor public governance. Delaying the transition could cause further turbulence.

A return to constitutional order seems unlikely without a real will from the Transitional Military Council and the rebel movements to reach an agreement. Urgent action is needed to address embezzlement of public funds, inter-communal conflict and other security risks.

After four months of talks in Doha between the transitional government and Chadian politico-military groups, a peace agreement is in sight. But several difficult problems still need to be solved.

Stakeholders rejected a first draft agreement in May. A second version, apparently more consensual, was filed at the end of June by Qatar, the mediating party. The latest version still does not resolve differences on critical issues, such as the composition of the organizing committee of the inclusive national dialogue, the transitional charter and the reform of the army. These issues will determine the quality of future elections, the return to constitutional order and a transfer of power to civilians.

Pending an agreement, the government - possibly due to international pressure on the Transitional Military Council - announced that the national dialogue would take place on August 20. But the participation of politico-military groups remains unclear and the main ones, including the Front for Change and Concord in Chad and the Union of Resistance Forces, have withdrawn from the process. Moreover, a month is not enough to organize such an important meeting.

These pitfalls have given rise to intense demonstrations, such as the one organized in May by the civil society platform, Wakit Tama. In addition to challenging the Transitional Military Council, the platform rejects France's presence in Chad, particularly its perceived unconditional support for the junta.

The May protest led to acts of vandalism targeting French businesses, including TotalEnergies service stations. These actions were suppressed and the leaders arrested, tried and pardoned. The platform continues its call to demonstrate against the Transitional Military Council.

The country's internal security is also deteriorating. Inter-community conflicts are increasingly bloody due to the easy circulation of weapons. In May, clashes in Kouri Bougoudi, a gold mining area in the north of the country, left more than 200 dead. Many other localized conflicts also erupted this year.

At the various borders of Chad, the situation is just as volatile. To the west, other countries in the Lake Chad Basin (Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria) – continue to be rocked by attacks by Boko Haram factions. In the far north, the volatile situation in southern Libya poses a threat as rebel groups, armed gangs and traffickers move effortlessly between the two countries.

In the east, the ongoing intercommunal conflicts in Darfur threaten to spill over into Chad. The border situation with the Central African Republic to the south remains fragile, with rebel groups still at war with the political authorities in Bangui.

In June, the Chadian government officially declared